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ASSUMPTION OF OBLIGATIONS: THIRD PARTY

No MORE

In more than one sense has the concept of assumption of obligations
been a "third party." While the basis for NA 1821-18241 on assumption
of obligations 2 is nothing new to Louisiana jurisprudence, there have

never been any code articles on assumption of obligations until now.
In this sense the concept of assumption of obligations has been a "third
party," not part of the code but part of the jurisprudence. However,
it is more important that code articles never existed as to assumption
of obligations because assumptions of obligations were often considered
as third-party-beneficiary contracts. In reality, assumptions of obligations

are not third-party-beneficiary contracts, and are deserving of separate
code articles. With the enactment of NA 1821-1824, assumptions of
obligations will no longer be considered "third parties."

The Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence on assumption of obligations arose out of situations in which a vendee assumed a mortgage on some property as part

Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Articles 1756-2291 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 [hereinafter cited as
OA (old articles)] were repealed and replaced by new articles 1756-2057 [hereinafter cited
as NA]; see 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 1. NA 1821 provides:
An obligor and a third person may agree to an assumption by the latter of
an obligation of the former. To be enforceable by the obligee against the third
*

person, the agreement must be made in writing.
The obligee's consent to the agreement does not effect a release of the obligor.
The unreleased obligor remains solidarily bound with the third person.
NA 1822 provides: "A person, who by agreement with the obligor, assumes the obligation
of the latter is bound only to the extent of his assumption. The assuming obligor may
raise any defense based on the contract by which the assumption was made."
NA 1823 provides: An obligee and a third person may agree on an assumption by the
latter of an obligation owed by another to the former. That agreement must be made in
writing. That agreement does not effect a release of the original obligor."
NA 1824 provides:
A person who, by agreement with the obligee, has assumed another's obligation
may not raise against the obligee any defense based on the relationship between
the assuming obligor and the original obligor.
The assuming obligor may raise any defense based on the relationship between
the original obligor and the obligee. He may not invoke compensation based
on an obligation owed by the obligee to the original obligor.
2. The assumption of a
however, the assumption of
subject to a mortage. In an
debt, but where the property
stake. Cf. Balfour v. Chew,

mortgage is a common type of assumption of an obligation;
a mortgage must be distinguished from buying property
assumption, the assuming party is personally liable for the
is purchased subject to a mortgage, only the property is at
4 Mart. (n.s.) 154 (La. 1826).
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of the price for the conveyance of the property from the original
mortgagor.' Cognizant of the possibility of effectuating a novation by
the substitution of debtors in such an assumption, Louisiana courts have
protected the mortgagee-creditor from losing a responsible debtor by
declaring that when a third person assumes another's debt, the assumption does not operate as a novation so as to discharge the original
debtor, unless the creditor has expressly declared his intention to discharge the original debtor. 4 In giving the mortgagee-creditor a right of
action against the assuming debtor without discharging the original debtor,
Louisiana courts early decided that an assumption of a mortgage was
a third-party-beneficiary contract made for the mortgagee-creditor's favor.' However, the determination that an assumption of a mortgage
was a third-party-beneficiary contract was not consistently followed in
6
subsequent decisions.
In Tiernan v. Martin,7 the court, quoting from Pothier, 8 refused to
classify the assumption of a mortgage as a stipulation pour autrui since
the stipulation was for the exclusive benefit of the stipulating party. 9
In Vinet v. Bres,'0 the court attempted to reconcile the rationale of
Tiernan with the earlier jurisprudence by stating that Tiernan stood only
for the proposition that for stipulations to be of avail, they must be
accepted by the beneficiary, which is nothing more than what was
expressed by Civil Code article 1890." Although Vinet purported to
dispense with the language of Tiernan, the proposition that an assumption of an obligation is not a third-party-beneficiary contract remained alive in later decisions.' 2 However, despite the confusion as to

3. Mayor v. Bailey, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 321 (La. 1818).
4. Jacobs v. Calderwood, 4 La. Ann. 509 (1849).
5. Mayor v. Bailey, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 321 (La. 1818); Jacobs v. Calderwood, 4 La.
Ann. 509 (1849).
6. Tiernan v. Martin, 2 Rob. 523 (La. 1842); Campti Motor Co. v. Jolley, 10 La.
App. 287, 120 So. 684 (2d Cir. 1929); Freedman v. Ratcliff, 183 La. 1, 162 So. 783
(1935); Moriarty v. Weiss, 196 La. 34, 198 So. 643 (1939).
7. 2 Rob. 523 (La. 1842).
8. To stipulate that anything shall be delivered or paid to a third party designated
by the agreement, is not to stipulate for another. For instance, if I contract to
sell to you an estate for a thousand pounds, which it is agreed shall be paid
to Peter, it is not for him, but for myself, that I make this stipulation; Peter
is only introduced into the agreement as a person to receive the money for me
and in my name, and is what the Roman jurists call adjectus solutionis prata.
I M. Pothier, Treatise on the Law of Obligations no. 57, at 132 (W. Evans ed. & trans.
3d ed. 1853).
9. 2 Rob. at 525.
10. 48 La. Ann. 1254, 20 So. 693 (1895).
11. Id.at 1264, 20 So. at 697.
12. Campti Motor Co. v. Jolley, 10 La. App. 287, 120 So. 684 (2d Cir. 1929);
Freedman v. Ratcliff, 183 La. 1, 162 So. 783 (1935); Moriarty v. Weiss, 196 La. 34, 198
So. 643 (1939).
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the nature of assumption of an obligation, the courts consistently applied
the basic notion that an assumption of an obligation does not create a
novation unless the creditor has expressly declared his intention to discharge the original debtor. 3
Although the Tiernan court apparently used the quotation from
Pothier erroneously and applied it out of context,14 the proposition that
an assumption of an obligation is not a third-party-beneficiary contract
is tenable. Accordingly, the purpose of the enactment of NA 1821-1824
was to take assumptions out of the framework of the third-partybeneficiary provisions by creating independent provisions on assumption
of obligations.' 5 While the necessity of differentiating between thirdparty-beneficiary contracts and assumption of obligations has been questioned, 6 the inclusion of assumptions of obligations in the framework
of third-party-beneficiary contracts has bent the framework of thirdparty-beneficiary contracts out of shape.
While assumptions of obligations and third-party-beneficiary contracts are similar in that they both involve three parties, there exists a
difference between them that warrants separate code articles. In Tiernan
and its progeny, the courts consistently noted that in an assumption the
benefit was not for the obligee but for the stipulating party."' Arguably,
the court's reluctance to consider an assumption as a third-party-beneficiary contract was rooted in the court's unwillingness to give the
obligee an action to force the assuming party to abide by an assumption
that was not for the obligee's benefit. Inequity would result if the
original obligor and the third party subsequently attempted to revoke

13. Jacobs v. Calderwood, 4 La. Ann. 509 (1849); Union Bank v. Bowman, 9 La.
Ann. 195 (1854); Latiolais v. Citizen's Bank, 33 La. Ann. 1444 (1881); Issacs v. Van
Hoose, 171 La. 676, 131 So. 845 (1930).
14. [Pothier] had argued that, in accordance with Roman doctrine, where a stipulation was made in which the promisee had no enforceable interest, because
nothing had been stipulated for himself, the stipulation would fail since the
third party under such a doctrine, could not enforce it also. In the given passage
Pothier was attempting to state a case where the stipulation would be effective
because the promisee would have an enforceable interest; he was not trying to
state a cause where the third party would not have an interest. This distinction
is necessary to an accurate evaluation of the passage.
Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11 Tul. L.
Rev. 18, 25 (1936).
15. NA 1821, comment (b).
16. Obligations Revision-meeting of Louisiana State Law Institute, January 11-12,
1980, at 3 ("Denson Smith argued that special articles on 'Assumption' were not needed.
He thought that the articles on stipulation pour autrui would cover all problems.") (on
file with Louisiana State Law Institute, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana). See generally Smith, supra note 14.
17. Tiernan v. Martin, 2 Rob. at 525 (La. 1842); Campti Motor Co. v. Jolley, 10
La. App. at 289, 120 So. at 685 (2d Cir. 1929); Freedman v. Ratcliff, 183 La. at 8, 162
So. at 785 (1935); Moriarty v. Weiss, 196 La. at 61, 198 So. at 652 (1939).
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the stipulation but the obligee could force the assuming party to abide
by the assumption. After all, if the original obligor continued to meet
the obligation owed to the obligee, it would seem that the obligee would
have no reason to object to the revocation of the stipulation. However,
if, in the assumption between the original obligor and the assuming
party, the assuming party also obligated himself to the obligee, then it
would be equitable to allow the obligee an action to force the assuming
party to abide by the assumption despite attempts by the original obligor
and the assuming party to revoke the stipulation.
Hence, in an assumption of an obligation, a right of action does
not inure to the obligee until the assuming party obligates himself to
the obligee. 18 Consequently, an assumption of an obligation is not a
third-party-beneficiary contract since in a third-party-beneficiary contract
a right of action inures to the third-party-beneficiary without his being
a party to the stipulation.19 To the contrary, in third-party-beneficiary
contracts, the beneficiary is never a party to the contract. 20 Therefore,
in assumptions of obligations, a stipulation pour autrui does not exist
because the contract is not for another, but for a party to the agreement.
Consequently, the jurisprudence stating that an assumption of an obligation is not a third-party-beneficiary contract is correct.
French Law
Ironically, NA 1821, which envisions an assumption by agreement
between the original obligor and a third party, and NA 1823, which
envisions an assumption by agreement between the obligee and the third
party, have their origins in novation. 21 Subjective novation, which is the
substitution of one debtor for another, was subdivided under French
law into delegation, (in which the original debtor procures a new debtor
for his creditor) and expromission (in which the new debtor binds himself
to the creditor without the consent of the original debtor). 22 Under

18. For all practical purposes, in an assumption of an obligation the obligee should
be a party to the assumption. At least in assumption of mortgages, what are known
colloquially as "due on sale" clauses allow banking institutions to mature the indebtness
of the mortgagor if the payment of the mortgage is assumed by a purchaser. Consequently,
an assuming party would be forced to deal with the bank in an assumption of a mortgage.
See La. R.S. 6:833 (Supp. 1984).
19. See United States v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 522 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. Merco Mfg. Co. v. J. P. McMichael Constr. Co., 372 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. La.
1974); see also Smith, supra note 14, at 33.
21. 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law pt. 1, no. 540(2), at 301 (11th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. Trans. 1959); 1 C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 324(l)(b), at
229 (E. Bartin 6th ed. 1942, La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1965). Cf. Comment, The Requisites
and Effects of Novation: A Comparative Survey, 25 Tul. L. Rev. 100, 108 (1950).
22. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 21, no. 540(2), at 301.
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Louisiana law, OA 2191 contemplated both delegation and expromission,
23
though not explicitly.
The French concept of delegation is the basis for NA 1821, since
24
both envision the original debtor procuring a new debtor for his creditor.
Consistent with NA 1821, a delegation consists of a delegatee who is
the creditor, a delegator who is the original debtor and a delegated who
is the new debtor. 25 Furthermore, not unlike the Louisiana jurisprudence
which gave rise to NA 1821, in a delegation the delegator usually is
the debtor of the delegatee and creditor of the delegated. 26 However,
NA 1821 is not expressly limited to such a situation, and apparently
gratuitous assumptions by third parties are within the scope of NA
1821.27
Subjective novation by delegation requires the concurrence of all
three parties. 28 A delegation is effected when the delegatee procures the
obligation of the delegated on the invitation of the delegator. 29 Since
the consent of the delegatee is necessary to create a delegation, the
delegatee does not have an action against the delegated until the delegated
obligates himself personally to the delegatee. 30 NA 1821 is in accord
with the requirement that all three parties concur before a right of
action arises for the delegatee, since therein lies the distinction between
an assumption of an obligation and a third-party-beneficiary contract.
In harmony with NA 1886 (a novation article that complements NA
1821-1824), delegation is not considered the same as novation and results
in novation only if the creditor expressly discharged the original debtor.3'
However, under French law the intention to novate does not need to
be in writing or even declared, but could be tacit-implied either from
the nature of the contract, or from external circumstances.1 2 Accordingly,

23. La. Civ. Code art. 2191 ("Novation by the substitution of a new debtor may
take place without the concurrence of the former debtor."); see also NA 1882.
24. See 2 M. Planiol, supra note 21, no. 540(2), at 301.
25. Id. no. 551, at 306.
26. Id. no. 552, at 306.
27. Id. Compare NA 1978 with OA 1890, which required that a third-party-beneficiary
contract be made as part of either a commutative contract or an onerous donation.
28. 1 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 21, no. 324(1), at 229.
29. 2 M. Plainol, supra note 21, no. 558, at 310.
30. [T~he stipulation pour autrui gives the third party an immediate right, while in
the delegation, the delegator confines himself to inviting the delegated to go
and obligate himself personally to the delegatee. The direct action of the latter
does not arise until the stipulation has been made, which is necessarily after
the invitation by the delegator.
Id. no. 559, at 311-12 (citation omitted).
31. 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 21, § 324(4), at 236.
32. 2 M. Plainol, supra note 21, no. 555, at 308-09.
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Louisiana jurisprudence has indicated that acts tantamount to an express
declaration will suffice33 to create a novation.
In Walton v. Beauregard,3 4 the court, in holding that novation had
occurred, stated, "We know of no more formal acceptance of a delegated
debtor, than commencing a suit against him to enforce the execution
of the obligation he has undertaken towards the creditor." 3 However,
Walton was subsequently considered questionable authority for the contention that suit against the delegated debtor was evidence of an intention
by the creditor to discharge the original debtor.3 6 Yet in Walton, the
creditor, without the consent of the original debtor, had made stipulations for delay-rendering the contract more onerous as to the delegated
debtor.37 Although a suit against a delegated debtor may not effect a
novation, when a creditor makes the contract more onerous without the
original debtor's consent, a novation should result.3" Novation is recognized in such a situation since a codebtor is released if a creditor
impairs his subrogation rights.3 9 NA 1821 does not appear to change
40
the law in this respect.
Since delegation does not imply novation, delegation is divided into
perfect delegation, which operates as a novation, and imperfect delegation, which does not. 41 Perfect delegation is considered inferior to
imperfect delegation because the latter is more advantageous to the
creditor.4 2 Consequently, perfect delegation is rarely encountered in prac3
tice. Imperfect delegation is also referred to as adstipulation
The Articles
Consistent with Louisiana jurisprudence and NA 1821, imperfect
delegation or adstipulation creates solidary co-debtors.44 The jurisprud33. Short v. New Orleans, 4 La. Ann. 281 (1849); Comment, supra note 21, at 113.
34. 1 Rob. 301 (La. 1842).
35. Id. at 303.
36. Jackson v. Williams, 11 La. Ann. 93 (1856).
37. 1 Rob. at 302.
38. Walton v. Beauregard, 1 Rob. 301 (La. 1842); Gay v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann.
497 (1880); Wilkinson v. Adams, 179 La. 630, 154 So. 630 (1934).
39. Issacs v. Van Hoose, 171 La. 676, 131 So. 845 (1931); Exchange Nat'l Bank of
Chicago v. Spalitta, 321 So. 2d 338 (La. 1975) (Sanders J., dissenting).
40. According to comment (a) to NA 1886 (a novation article which accompanies
the articles on assumption of obligations and replaces OA 2196), NA 1886 does not
change the law. Furthermore, under NA 1886 a novation does not occur unless the creditor
expressly discharges the original debtor, whereas under OA 2192, a novation occurred
when the creditor expressly declared that he intended to discharge the original debtor.
This change seems to conform the code to the jurisprudence.
41. 2 M. Plainol, supra note 21, no. 554, at 308.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Gay v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880); Simon v. McMeel, 167 La. 243, 119
So. 35 (1928); cf. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 21, no. 559, at 311.
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ence on assumption of obligations had suggested that the original debtor
and the assuming debtor are bound in imperfect solidarity to the creditor.
However, when NA 1821 states that "the unreleased obligor remains
solidarily bound with the third person," the distinction between perfect
and imperfect solidarity is not contemplated, since Foster v. Hampton 45
dispensed with such a distinction. Consequently, interruption of prescription as to either the assuming debtor or the original debtor is
effective as to the other.
While delegation is the basis of NA 1821, expromission is the basis
of NA 1823. Expromission, unlike delegation, requires only the concurrence of the creditor and the new debtor.4 6 Since NA 1823 contemplates an agreement between the creditor and the new debtor, an
assumption under NA 1823 can occur without the knowledge of the
original debtor. 47 In accord with NA 1821, NA 1823 is not explicitly
limited to onerous assumptions, and gratuitous assumptions should be
included within its scope. Despite the fact that NA 1823 is modeled
after expromission, it differs from expromission on when a novation is
effected. Expromission always suggests a novation, 4s while NA 1823
borrows from both delegation and NA 1821, and requires an express
intent to discharge the original debtor. Under French law, an expromission which does not operate as a novation is an adpromissio, or a
4 9
suretyship.
Although NA 1823 does not envision suretyship, 0 it is similar to
suretyship in that the obligee and the third party can arrange the third
party's assumption of the debt without the original obligor's knowledge.',
Furthermore, consistent with suretyship but different from NA 1821,
NA 1823 does not create solidarity between the original obligor and the
assuming obligor. This is due partially to the fact that solidarity in
reference to an obligation is never presumed and only arises from a
clear expression of the parties' intent or from the law 5 2 and while NA
1821 explicitly creates solidarity between the original and the assuming
debtors, NA 1823 does not.
45. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980). NA 1799 provides: "The interruption of prescription
against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors and their heirs." The
distinction between imperfect solidarity and perfect solidarity is that in imperfect solidarity
the liability arises from different acts or different times, whereas in perfect solidarity, the
liability arises from the same act at the same time. Imperfect solidarity does not interrupt
prescription as to the other co-debtors, while perfect solidarity does. Wooten v. Wimberly,
272 So. 2d. 303 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., concurring).
46. 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 21, no. 324(1), at 229.
47. NA 1823, comment (c).
48. 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 21, no. 324(4), at 326.
49. Id. at 236 n.38.
50. NA 1824, codiment (a).
51. La. Civ. Code art. 3038.
52. NA 1796.
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However, unlike suretyship, NA 1823 obligates the assuming obligor
to pay the debt regardless of the original obligor's ability or inability
to satisfy the debt. Furthermore, since the assuming obligor is unconditionally bound, the right of discussion" afforded the surety by article
3045 is inapplicable to NA 1823.
While NA 1821 and NA 1823 are derived from the French concepts
of adstipulation and adpromissio, Louisiana jurisprudence has imposed
4
the requirement that an assumption of an obligation be in writing.1
Furthermore, the similar promise to pay the debt of another which refers
to suretyship cannot be established by parol evidence and must be in
writing." Although the requirement that a promise to pay the debt of
another must be in writing is well established, there are exceptions to
this rule.
In Baskin v. Abell,5 6 an agreement by a transferee of a truck to
pay the transferor's debt to another as part of the price of the transfer
was held to be valid despite the fact that the agreement was not in
writing. The court stated that OA 2278(3), 7 which prohibits the use of
parol evidence to prove the promise to pay the debt of another, "contemplates the mere promise of one man to be responsible for another,
and cannot be interposed as a cover to shield against the actual obligations of the defendant himself ... ."I8 Later in Coreil v. Vidrine,

9

the court held that parol evidence was competent to prove the promise
to pay the debt of a third person if the promissor has a material interest
in making the promise and receives consideration for it. 60 Apparently
6
NA 1821 and NA 1823 embrace the Coreil approach. 1
However, if NA 1821 and NA 1823 embrace the Coreil approach,
the writing requirement of NA 1821 and NA 1823 may be drastically
limited. Certainly, when there has been a gratuitous assumption the
assumption would have to be in writing since the promisor does not
receive consideration for his promise. On the other hand, when there

53. Code of Civil Procedure article 5151 provides: "Discussion is the right of a
secondary obligor to compel the creditor to enforce the obligation against the property
of the primary obligor .... ." See also La. Civ. Code art. 3045.
54. Fontenot v. Marquette Cas. Co., 258 La. 671, 247 So. 2d 572 (1971) (treating
of stipulation pour autrui); Whittington v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 385 So. 2d 863 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 So. 2d 738 (La. 1980).
55. Hill v. Atwater, 24 La. Ann. 325 (1872); Baker v. Pagaud, 26 La. Ann. 220
(1874); Hamilton v. Hodges, 30 La. Ann. 1290 (1878); Guillot v. Guillot, 141 La. 81,
74 So. 702 (1917); NA 1847; OA 2278(3).
56. 14 La. App. 601, 122 So. 133 (2d Cir. 1929).
57. See NA 1847.
58. Id.at 603, 122 So. at 134.
59. 188 La. 343, 177 So. 233 (1937).
60. Id.at 352, 177 So. at 236.
61. NA 1823, comment (b); cf. NA 1821, comment (e).
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has been a novation along with the assumption, arguably, the assumption
would not have to be in writing since the principle behind OA 2278(3)
is that suretyship or an accessory obligation needs to be in writing,
whereas an independent obligation does not. As for assumptions in
which the assuming obligor has received consideration, and no novation
has been effected, whether the requirement of writing is applicable is
unclear.
In Fabacher v. Crampes,62 the earliest Louisiana case to espouse the
inapplicability of OA 2278(3) when the promisor receives consideration
for his promise, while the court did state that "the prohibition against
the admission of parol evidence to prove promise to pay the debt of
another does not apply. . . when the promise is made upon adequate
consideration .
the court qualified this statement by stating "[flor
in [this] case it is an original and direct undertaking by the promisor
towards the debtor himself, and not at all a collateral undertaking to
' 64
pay the debt of another.
Arguably, what the court in Fabacher was precluding from the
exception to the writing requirement imposed by OA 2278(3) were suretyships, and NA 1821 and NA 1823 clearly do not envision suretyship.
Furthermore, NA 1821 and NA 1823 do envision original and direct
undertakings by assuming obligors to obligees. Consequently, if NA 1821
and NA 1823 adhere strictly to Coreil, the requirement of writing as
explicitly provided in NA 1821 and NA 1823 would be effectively limited
to gratuitous assumptions. This limitation would seem contrary to the
purpose of providing explicitly the requirement of writing in assumption
of an obligation. The more logical approach would be to limit the
exception to the writing requirement to assumptions that effect a novation
since such an assumption could in no sense be considered an accessorial
obligation, 65 and could only be considered as a principal obligation.
NA 1822, which accompanies NA 1821, states that a person who,
by agreement with the obligor, assumes the obligation of the latter is
bound only to the extent of his assumption. This is supported by
Louisiana jurisprudence as well as French law. 66 Although NA 1822
states that "the assuming obligor may raise any defense based on the
*..."6

62. 166 La. 397, 117 So. 439 (1928).
63. Id.at 402, 117 So. at 441.
64. Id.
65. While NA 1821 and NA 1823 do not envision suretyship, the assuming obligor
can still assert defenses that the original obligor had against the obligee. This indicates
that the contract between the assuming obligor and the obligee is still dependent on the
contract between the original obligor and the obligee. With a novation, such a dependency
does not exist and the assumption is a completely independent undertaking.
66. Capital Loans, Inc. v. Stassi, 195 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); 2 M.
Planiol, supra note 21, no. 552, at 306.
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contract by which the assumption was made," this is unsupported by
the concept of delegation.67 However, Louisiana jurisprudence has long
held that a creditor's rights against the assuming debtor can be no
greater than the original debtor's rights against the assuming debtor. 6
Consequently, if the original debtor fails to perform his part of the
agreement in an assumption, the assuming debtor, if he asserts such a
defense, should be relieved of the assumption. 69 Additionally, NA 1822
allows the assuming obligor defenses which the original obligor may
have against the obligee. However, the assuming obligor may not raise
defenses purely personal to the original obligor against the obligee.70
NA 1824, which accompanies NA 1823, states that in an agreement
of assumption between the obligee and the assuming obligor, the assuming obligor "may not raise against the obligee any defense based
on the relationship between the assuming obligor and the original obligor." This is in contrast to NA 1822. The difference between NA 1824
and NA 1823 is justified by the fact that in an agreement of assumption
between the obligee and the assuming obligor, the original obligor is
not a party to the agreement and the assumption can occur without his
knowledge. However, NA 1824 does allow the assuming obligor "any
defense based on the relationship between the original obligor and the
obligee" since this relationship determines the existence of the debt being
assumed. Yet, like NA 1822, defenses purely personal to the original
obligor against the obligee are not allowed under NA 1824.
Contrary to article 2211, which allows a surety to assert compensation 7"
of what the creditor owes to a principal debtor, NA 1824 states that
the assuming obligor "may not invoke compensation based on an obligation owed by the obligee to the original obligor." The difference
between article 2211 and NA 1824 is justified by the fact that the
situation contemplated in NA 1823 is not a suretyship and the assuming
debtor is not secondarily liable but is bound unconditionally. Therefore,
like the right of discussion, the right to assert compensation between
the obligee and the original obligor is inconsistent with the assumption
of an obligation envisioned by NA 1824.
Conclusion
In brief, although Louisiana law on novation implicitly contemplated
delegation and expromission, the French concepts of adstipulation and

67. I M. Pothier, supra note 8, no. 566, at 445.
68. See cases cited supra note 6.
69. Id.
70. NA 1822, comment (c). Common personal defenses are minority, incapacity and
bankruptcy.
71. "When two persons are indebted to each other, there takes place between them
a compensation that extinguishes both the debts ....... OA 2207; see also NA 1893.
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adpromissio were not carried over from French law to Louisiana law.
Consequently, there arose a gap in Louisiana law when the courts, in
dealing with assumptions, did not want to recognize a novation, but
instead desired to give the obligee an additional obligor. In refusing to
recognize a novation in an assumption the courts also stretched the
framework of third-party-beneficiary contracts to accommodate adstipulations. Otherwise, the effect of repudiating a novation in an assumption would leave the parties in the same situation that they had
occupied prior to the agreement, the creditor still having only one debtor.
With the enactment of NA 1821-1824, the Louisiana law is complete
as to the assumption of obligations, and the concept of third-partybeneficiary contracts does not need to be contorted. Now an assumption
of an obligation can be distinguished from a third-party-beneficiary
contract. An assumption of an obligation occurs either when an obligor
agrees with another that he will assume the obligor's debt or when a
third party agrees with the obligee that he will assume the obligor's
debt. However, unlike a third-party-beneficiary contract in which the
third-party-beneficiary is never a party to the contract, in an assumption
a right of action does not inure to the obligee until the assuming party
obligates himself to the obligee. Hence, an assumption can be distinguished from a third-party-beneficiary contract in that an assumption
requires the concurrence of all three parties, while a third-party-beneficiary contract only requires the concurrence of the stipulator and the
promisor. While novation is inapplicable to third-party-beneficiary contracts, due to the close nature of adstipulation and adpromissio to
novation, a novation will be effected if, in an assumption of an obligation, there is an express intent of the creditor to discharge the original
debtor. 72 Furthermore, if in an assumption of an obligation the original
obligor is released, contrary to NA 1821 and NA 1823, the assumption
does not need to be in writing.73 While the law as to the effect of
assumptions has not changed, the addition of' the NA 1821-1824 has
cleared up the confusion in Louisiana jurisprudence as to assumptions
and given adstipulation and adpromissio their rightful place in Louisiana
law.
John Tsai

72.
73.

See supra text accompanying note 34.
See supra text accompanying note 65.

